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Abstract
Live animal trade is considered a major mode of introduction of viruses from enzootic foci into disease-free areas.
Due to societal and behavioural changes, some wild animal species may nowadays be considered as pet species.
The species diversity of animals involved in international trade is thus increasing. This could benefit pathogens that
have a broad host range such as arboviruses. The objective of this study was to analyze the risk posed by live animal
imports for the introduction, in the European Union (EU), of four arboviruses that affect human and horses: Eastern
and Western equine encephalomyelitis, Venezuelan equine encephalitis and Japanese encephalitis. Importation data
for a five-years period (2005-2009, extracted from the EU TRACES database), environmental data (used as a proxy
for the presence of vectors) and horses and human population density data (impacting the occurrence of clinical
cases) were combined to derive spatially explicit risk indicators for virus introduction and for the potential
consequences of such introductions. Results showed the existence of hotspots where the introduction risk was the
highest in Belgium, in the Netherlands and in the north of Italy. This risk was higher for Eastern equine
encephalomyelitis (EEE) than for the three other diseases. It was mainly attributed to exotic pet species such as
rodents, reptiles or cage birds, imported in small-sized containments from a wide variety of geographic origins. The
increasing species and origin diversity of these animals may have in the future a strong impact on the risk of
introduction of arboviruses in the EU.
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Introduction
Emerging infectious diseases (EID) of human and animal
have become a major concern in the past decades. The
increasing occurrence of EID events [1] has been associated to
the ongoing epidemiological transition (changes in patterns of
diseases as societies develop) [2], a consequence of (i) the
globalization of economic activities and cultures, (ii) the
increasing rapidity and intensity of travel and distant contacts,
(iii) the change in migration patterns [3], (iv) the intensification
of urbanization, and (v) the climate change. EID events have
been identified and characterized [1,4–6] and emergence
mechanisms have been proposed and analyzed [7–12].
According to these studies, emerging pathogens are more
often RNA viruses, zoonotic and/or vector-borne involving a
broad host range. Since 2000, the European continent has
faced a number of EID events caused by arboviruses, such as
West Nile Virus (WNV) (lineage 1) in 2000 [13], Usutu virus in
2001 [14], WNV (lineage 2) in 2004 [15], bluetongue virus
serotype 8 in 2006 [16] (as well as other BTV serotypes in the
preceding years), Chikungunya in 2007 [17], Dengue in 2010
[18,19], and Schmallenberg virus in 2011 [20]. Some of these
pathogen introductions have resulted in limited epidemics
(Chikungunya, Dengue), other have given birth to large-scale
epidemic waves (bluetongue serotype 8, Schmallenberg virus)
[21]; some of these pathogens have become endemic in
several parts of Europe (Usutu virus, WNV [22–24]).
Pathogens are probably frequently introduced through the
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trade of live animals (or of products of animal origin) or through
the arrival of infected arthropod vectors, most of these
introductions being undetected [25]. In a recent prospective
study conducted by the European Centre for Disease
Prevention and Control, introduction of vector-borne diseases
by global trade was one of the eight scenarios, considered
plausible, of infectious disease threats facing the EU by 2020
[26].
Eastern and Western equine encephalomyelitis virus (EEEV
and WEEV), Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus (VEEV) and
Japanese encephalitis virus (JEV) are four zoonotic RNA
arboviruses that may cause lethal encephalitis in human and
horses. These diseases (Eastern and Western equine
encephalomyelitis [EEE and WEE], Venezuelan equine
encephalitis [VEE] and Japanese encephalitis [JE]) are
considered emerging [1] and a recent prioritization study
conducted in Europe ranked them among the 10 most
important animal diseases and zoonoses [27]. Arboviruses
introductions into previously free countries (or continents)
thanks to international movements of persons are regularly
reported (Chikungunya in Italy and Dengue in Croatia, France
and Portugal (Madeira) [17–19]). Infected vectors transported
with cargo may potentially allow the introduction of arboviruses
in free areas (it is one of the possible modes of introduction of
bluetongue virus serotype 8 in Northern Europe in 2006
[28–30]). Animal migrations may also support arbovirus
introductions (bird migrations may explain WNV introductions
into Europe [31]), as well as the trade of live animals (bird trade
is one of the hypotheses that could explain the introduction of
WNV in the Western hemisphere [32]).
Trade of live farm animals is a big business as, according to
FAO, total export value represented US$ 16.5 billion in 2009
(FAOSTAT, http://faostat.fao.org consulted 2012-08-29). This
total amount had doubled in ten years, with a total of US$ 8.7
billion in 1999. Total imports into European countries
represented approximately half of this total: US$ 8.9 billion in
2009 (US$ 4.0 billion in 1999). Wildlife trade also represents an
important market at the world level, with a total value estimated
€406 million for live animal trade. The European Union (EU) is
the world’s #1 importer for reptiles and cage birds [33].
Procedures for risk mitigation are routinely applied to secure
the trade of live animals, both before the departure of the
animals from their country of origin, and after their arrival in the
EU: veterinary checks, establishment of health certificates,
control of the origin of the imported animals, of their vaccination
status (e.g. for equines and for VEEV), or quarantine in vector-
free buildings (for cage birds, for example). However, these
procedures may fail, and a residual risk of virus introduction
persists by the trade of live animals. Live animals are not
imported everywhere in the EU. The destination of farm animal
consignments is linked to the spatial repartition of farms, and
the destination of wild animal consignments to the geographic
distribution of exotic pet buyers. For a given arbovirus, the
presence of competent vectors and hosts in the local fauna
also varies across the EU, as well as the density of susceptible
hosts, that may reveal the presence of the virus. Therefore, for
a given arboviral disease, the risk of introduction due to live
animal imports and the potential consequences of such an
introduction are likely to show strong geographic variations
across the EU, depending on trade characteristics, local
ecological conditions, and local population density.
This study was devoted to the residual risk (once risk
mitigation procedures have been applied) posed by legal live
animal imports into the EU (27 countries [EU27]) for the
introduction of four arboviral diseases. The objectives were (i)
to develop spatially explicit indicators of virus introduction risk
and of the potential consequences of virus introductions, (ii) to
map, using these indicators, the geographic variations of the
introduction risk of EEEV, WEEV, VEEV and JEV, and (iii) to
analyze the respective weights of farm animals and of exotic
pets in this introduction risk.
Materials and Methods
Data
Live animal trade. Data were obtained from the European
Commission (DG SANCO). The dataset was extracted from the
TRACES (TRAde Control and Expert System) database,
dedicated to the monitoring of live animals movements (and
movements of animal products), between third countries and
the EU (and within countries of the EU) (supporting information
S1). The 2005-2009 subset of the database was filtered
according to the country of origin and to the imported species
group. For each virus, host species considered at risk were set
according to literature: birds for WEEV; birds, rodents and
reptiles for EEEV; equines, rodents and primates for VEEV;
birds and swine for JEV (Table 1, Appendix S2). Before 2005,
EEE, WEE, VEE and JE in horses belonged to the List B of the
world organization for animal health (OIE) and the occurrence
of equine clinical cases had thus to be reported by member
states to the OIE. Since 2005, notifiable case definition has
changed for JE and EEE, which are now OIE-listed “multiple
species diseases”; whereas WEE and VEE remain OIE-listed
“equine diseases”. Equines are dead-end hosts in the
epidemiological cycle of the studied viruses (except for VEEV):
horses may reveal virus circulation but are not necessary to
this circulation. Furthermore, some level of underreporting
certainly exists for OIE-listed diseases (e.g. avian influenza
[34]:), especially for the former List B diseases, and
underreporting level probably varies according to the country.
For these reasons, rather than using OIE reports, consignment
origins considered at risk were defined according to the 4
disease world repartition maps described in literature: the
Americas for WEEV and EEEV, South America for VEEV,
southern and eastern Asia for JEV (Table 1, Appendix S2).
Origin and destination addresses of consignments were
geocoded at the city level or more accurately, using GPS
Vizualiser software, freely available (http://
www.gpsvizualiser.com). In the few cases in which geocoding
could not be achieved at the city level because of incomplete
addresses, the corresponding origin or destination coordinates
were set to the country or state capital. In TRACES, origin and
destination addresses are given by the consignor, and it cannot
be assumed that the points resulting from the geocoding
process exactly correspond to the origin and destination of the
imported animals. To take into account this probable
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imprecision, origin and destination points were discretized
using a 10 km radius hexagonal grid covering the EU27. The
coordinates of the origin and destination cells were computed
for each consignment.
Land cover. Data were extracted from the CORIN
(Coordination de l’information sur l’environnement) land cover
(CLC) database, provided by the European Environment
Agency [35]. The 44 classes of the CLC nomenclature aim at
describing perennial structures of land occupation and are
organized into a general-purpose 3-level hierarchy. We used
the 2000 version of CLC, at a 1:250,000 working scale
(resolution of 250 m). CLC data were discretized using the 10
km radius hexagonal grid covering the EU27. For each cell of
this grid, we computed the proportion of the cell area covered
by each of the 44 themes of CLC nomenclature.
Population density. Population density data were extracted
from the database “Population density grid of EU-27+” version
5 [36] provided by the European Environment Agency. This
Table 1. Species group, geographic origin of the imported
animals, and European vector species considered to
analyze the introduction risk in the European Union of
Eastern equine encephalomyelitis virus (EEEV), Western
equine encephalomyelitis virus (WEEV), Venezuelan
equine encephalitis virus (VEEV), and Japanese
encephalitis virus (JEV).
Virus
Imported species
group Geographic origin
European vector
species [39]
EEEV
[49–51]
Rodents4, poultry1
and other birds2,
reptiles3
Northern America,
Central America,
Caribbean, South
America
Culex pipiens, Aedes
vexans8, Aedes
albopictus9
WEEV
[52]
Poultry and other
birds
Northern America,
Central America,
Caribbean, South
America
Aedes vexans, Aedes
caspius10, Aedes
dorsalis10
VEEV [53] Rodents
4,
Primates5, Horses6
Central America,
Caribbean, South
America
Aedes albopictus
JEV [8] Poultry
1 and other
birds2, Swine7
Southeastern Asia,
Eastern Asia, India,
Pakistan
Culex pipiens, Aedes
albopictus
1 TRACES commodity code: 0105 (“Live poultry, that is to say, fowls of the species
Gallus domesticus, ducks, geese, turkeys and guinea fowls”).
2 TRACES commodity code: 010631 (“birds of prey”), 010632 (“Psittaciformes,
including parrots, parakeets, macaws and cockatoos”), and 010639 (“Other birds”).
3 TRACES commodity code: 010620 (“Reptiles, including snakes and turtles”).
4 TRACES commodity code: code 010619 (“Other mammals”) and “Rodentia”
specified in taxonomic data.
5 TRACES commodity code: code 010611.
6 TRACES commodity code: code 0101 (“Live horses, asses, mules and hinnies”).
7 TRACES commodity code: code 0103 (“Live swine”).
8 Current taxonomic denomination: Aedimorphus vexans.
9 Current taxonomic denomination: Stegomyia albopicta.
10 Current taxonomic denomination: Ochlerotatus caspius and Ochlerotatus
dorsalis
database is derived from the CLC database (2000 version) and
contains the population density (number of inhabitants per
square km) at a 1 km resolution for the EU27 and Croatia. This
dataset was discretized using the 10 km radius hexagonal grid.
For each cell of this grid, we computed the average population
density (Figure 1, left). Horse population has not been
quantified as precisely as human population, and several data
sources were combined to derive realistic horse density data.
The number of animals living in farms of each administrative
area (NUTS 2 level) in 2007 was obtained from the
EUROSTAT database (“Livestock: number of farms and heads
by size of farm and NUTS 2 regions”, http://
appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?
dataset=ef_ls_ovaareg&lang=en, consulted 2012-08-27).
However, this database only considers farm animals, and thus
underestimates global horse population size. At the country
level, global horse population estimates have been obtained in
a recent study by Liljenstolpe [37]. These estimates were used
to compute NUTS 2-level animal densities, assuming that the
geographic distribution of horses housed in farms (EUROSTAT
dataset) was representative of the global population. The
resulting horse density map was discretized using the 10 km
radius hexagonal grid. For each cell of this grid, we computed
the average horse density (Figure 1, right).
Indicator of virus introduction risk
The virus introduction risk depends on the number of
imported animals and on their geographic origin. Areas
considered at risk for consignment origins were the repartition
areas of the four viruses described in literature (see Appendix
S2). These areas are large and the studied viruses certainly do
not circulate everywhere each year, but only seasonally, in
specific but unknown sub-areas. Without an accurate
knowledge of these areas, virus introduction risk is thus difficult
to quantify precisely. However, it can reasonably be assumed
that this risk increases with the diversity of the geographic
origins of the consignments (within the geographic areas
considered for virus introduction): when origins diversity
increases, the probability that at least one consignment
originates from an area where virus circulates also increases. If
we assume that, in these areas, the infection prevalence has a
comparable low level in reservoir species, the two major drivers
of the introduction risk are the number of imported individuals
and the diversity of their origins. Based on these assumptions,
an empirical indicator Ii, for virus introduction risk in a given 10
km diameter hexagonal cell was defined:
Ii=log Ni 1+Si (1)
where Ni is the total number of animals imported into cell i
(log-transformed to buffer the large variations of consignment
sizes according to the species), and Si is the Simpson’s
diversity index [38] of the consignment geographic origin for
cell i:
Si=1−
∑nj n j−1
N N−1 (2)
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where, for each possible origin cell j, nj is the total number of
animals imported from that cell. Simpson’s diversity index is the
probability that two randomly taken imported animals originate
from the same origin cell: it varies between 0 if all the imported
animals come from the same cell, to 1 if each originates from a
distinct cell.
The 2005-2009 cumulated value of the introduction risk
indicator was computed for each cell of the 10 km diameter
hexagonal grid covering the EU27, and for each of the four
considered viruses.
Potential consequences of virus introduction
Two potential consequences of virus introduction were
successively analyzed: (i) the infection of local vectors by the
imported animals, and (ii) the occurrence of clinical cases in
human and horses. A scientific review was conducted by the
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) in 2009 to determine
the potential European vector species for selected arboviruses
[39]. According to this study, five European vector species
were considered competent for one or several of the studied
viruses: Culex pipiens, Aedes vexans, Aedes albopictus,
Aedes dorsalis and Aedes caspius (Table 1). For each of the
studied viruses and for a given 10 km hexagonal cell i, the
potential infection of local vectors was quantified by the product
of (i) the virus introduction risk, and (ii) the probability that a
competent vector population is present in cell i:
Ci= Ii 1−∏v=1V 1−Hv,i (3)
where Ii is the virus introduction risk for cell i, V is the total
number of competent vector species, and Hv,i is the probability
that at a given point inside cell i, a population of vector species
v is present.
For a vector species and for a hexagonal cell, we used the
proportion of the cell area covered by a suitable habitat as a
proxy for the presence of a vector population. The calculation
of this proportion was based upon land cover data and
entomologist expert knowledge: for each vector species and for
each CLC land cover theme, a three-level value was defined
(non-suitable, moderately suitable, highly suitable) (Table 2).
For a competent vector species v, the proportion Hv,i of the cell
i covered by a suitable habitat was then:
Hv,i= 1Z∑k=1M mi,kwv,k (4)
where Z is the number of pixels in a 10 km diameter cell, M
is the number of land cover themes in CLC nomenclature, mi,k
is the number of cell i pixels that belong to land cover theme k,
and wv,k=1 if the land cover theme k is a highly suitable habitat
for the vector v, 0.5 if it is moderately suitable, and 0 if it is not
suitable. Additional constraints (Table 2) were applied for Ae.
vexans (neighbourhood between prairies or forests and water
bodies or courses, because these landscapes are suitable for
presence of Ae. vexans eggs only if they can be flooded) and
for Ae. albopictus (administrative subdivisions where its
presence has been reported, according to data collected by the
European network of medical entomologists and public health
experts VBORNET http://ecdc.europa.eu, consulted
2012-04-25).
The potential occurrence of clinical cases in human and
horses was finally quantified by the product of (i) the potential
infection of local vectors, and (ii) the local population density of
Figure 1.  Population density of human (left) and of horses (right) in the European Union.  
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0070000.g001
Live Animal Trade and Arboviral Disease Emergence
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 4 July 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 7 | e70000
Table 2. Suitability of land cover themes (CORINE
nomenclature) for Culex pipiens, Aedes caspius, Aedes
dorsalis, Aedes vexans and Aedes albopictus habitat (-:
non-suitable: +/-: moderately suitable, +: highly suitable).
Land cover themes
Cx.
pipiens
Ae.
caspius,
Ae.
dorsalis
Ae.
vexans
Ae.
albopictus
Artificial surfaces Urban fabric + - - +c
 
Industrial,
commercial,
transport units
+ - - +c
 Mineralextraction sites - +/- - +
c
 Dump sites - - - +c
 Constructionsites + - - +
c
 
Artificial, non-
agric. vegetated
areas
+ - - +c
Arable land Non-irrigatedarable land - - - -
 Permanentlyirrigated land + - - -
 Rice fields + +/- + -
Permanent crops Vineyards - - - -
 Fruit trees andberry plantations + - - -
 Olive groves - - - -
Pastures  - - +a -
Heterogeneous
agric.
Annual crops
with permanent
crops
- - - -
areas Other + - - -
Forests Broad-leavedforest - - +
a -
 Other - - - -
Scrub,
herbaceous
Natural
grasslands - - +
a -
vegetation Other - - - -
Open spaces with little or no
vegetation - - - -
Inland wetlands Inland marshes - +/- +b -
 Peat bogs - - - -
Maritime wetlands Salt marshes,salines - + - -
 Intertidal flats - - - -
Inland waters Water courses + - +b -
 Water bodies + - +b -
Marine waters Estuaries - + + -
 Other - - - -
a Only in the vicinity of inland marshes, water courses or water bodies
b Only in the vicinity of pastures, broad-leaved forest or natural grasslands
c Only inside administrative subdivisions where the presence of Ae. albopictus has
been reported (ECDC-VBORNET)
disease-susceptible hosts. The 2005-2009 cumulated value of
this indicator was computed for each 10 km hexagonal cell of a
grid covering the EU27, for each of the four considered viruses.
Numerical analysis
To identify regions with the highest introduction risk, virus-
specific choropleth maps were drawn, based on the percentiles
of the distributions of cell-specific indicator values. Maps were
smoothed using an inverse distance weighting scheme. Global
virus-specific relative risks were calculated by computing the
sum (over the EU27) of the cell-specific indicator values, taking
as a reference the value obtained for EEEV. The risk fraction
attributable to each species or species group was computed by
removing the corresponding consignments, and by computing
a reduced risk using the resulting dataset. The risk fraction
attributable to the species group was the difference between
the total risk (computed using the complete dataset) and the
reduced risk, divided by the total risk.
Results
Live animal imports
A total number of 150,154 vertebrate consignments entered
the EU27 between 2005 and 2009, corresponding to 2.85
billion animals. Most of these were fishes: 2.78 billions animals
against 65.7 millions of other vertebrates, corresponding
respectively to 86,496 and 63,606 consignments. Among these
consignments, 12,054 were considered for the risk of
introduction of EEEV, WEEV, VEEV and JEV, corresponding to
a total number of 22.5 million animals (Table 3). These were
sent from 628 distinct hexagonal cells located in the Americas
and Southeast Asia (Figures S1 and S2), and were delivered
into 1,070 distinct cells in the EU27 (Figures S3 and S4). For
WEEV, the vast majority of imports originated from countries
that had reported disease cases to the OIE between 2005 and
2009 (100% for poultry and 91% for the other bird species). It
was also the case for EEEV (100% for poultry, 91% for the
other bird species, 95% for reptiles and 99% for rodents) and
for JEV (84% for the other bird species, neither swine nor
poultry imports occurred from countries considered for JEV
introduction risk). This proportion was lower for VEEV as none
of the imported equines originated from a country that had
reported disease cases to the OIE between 2005 and 2009.
However, this proportion was 30% for rodents and 81% for
primates (World Animal Health Information Database,
consulted 2012-08-27, http://www.oie.int/wahis_2/public/
wahid.php/Wahidhome/Home).
Indicator of virus introduction risk
At the level of the EU27, the introduction risk was highest for
EEEV. Taking EEEV as a reference, this introduction risk was
approximately 3 times lower for WEEV, 5 times lower for VEEV
and 50 times lower for JEV (Table 4). Introduction risk
appeared relatively stable over time for EEEV, WEEV and
VEEV. A marked decline was observed for JEV between 2005
and 2006, and the risk level increased slowly afterwards
(Figure 2). For EEEV, approximately 70% of the introduction
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risk was attributable to exotic pets (rodents, birds other than
poultry, reptiles). The opposite result was obtained for WEEV
and VEEV with, respectively, 71% and 98% of introduction risk
attributable to non-pet species (poultry for WEEV, mainly
horses for VEEV) (Table 4). As neither poultry nor swine were
imported from Southeast Asia, 100% of JEV introduction risk
was attributable to birds other than poultry. Marked geographic
variations of introduction risk indicator were observed (Figure
3). The risk map appeared patchy, areas with the highest risks
(99th percentile of the distribution) were located in the
Netherlands (EEEV, WEEV, JEV), Belgium (EEEV, VEEV,
JEV), the south of England (VEEV, EEEV), the north of Italy
(EEEV, WEEV, VEEV), and the west of France (EEEV,
WEEV). All over the EU, country capitals and major cities were
associated to higher values of introduction risk indicator.
Potential consequences of virus introduction
Culex pipiens is the most common mosquito species in
Europe. As expected, most of the EU land surface contained
Table 3. Total volume of live animal imports (heads, brackets: consignments) reported to the TRACES database between
2005 and 2009, for horses, swine, poultry, other birds, primates, reptiles and rodents.
Species Origin of the animals Total
 Europe Africa Asia America Australia  
   SE Other parts Northern Southern New Zealand  
Horses 75,043 (7,172) 2,118 (460) 43,035 (481) 4,698 (1,329) 15,496 (6,976) 15,7033 (2,025) 1,494 (681) 157,587 (19,124)
Swine 2,052 (31) 4 (2) 04 (0) 0 (0) 2,332 (87) 0 (0) 0 (0) 4,388 (120)
Poultry 607,348 (101) 0 (0) 04 (0) 214,054 (31) 15.5 M1,2 (518) 61,9451, 2 (7) 0 (0) 16.3 M5 (657)
Primates 934 (62) 17,460 (225) 23,682 (209) 613 (26) 518 (22) 6673 (21) 2 (2) 43,876 (567)
Other birds 384,025 (424) 622,995 (444) 16,3094 (79) 14,020 (109) 391,3481, 2 (169) 49,2091, 2 (160) 2,062 (12) 1,479,968 (1,397)
Reptiles 74,935 (234) 1,570,393 (1,897) 820,150 (623) 84,702 (127) 5,881,3211 (2,580) 427,5291 (605) 42 (1) 8,859,072 (6,067)
Rodents 132,795 (822) 17,743 (100) 239,506 (642) 6,915 (109) 215,7801 (5,879) 4481, 3 (11) 608 (63) 613,795 (7,626)
Total 1,277,132 (8,826) 2,230,713 (3,128) 1,142,682 (2,034) 325,002 (1,731) 22 M (16,231) 549,871 (2,829) 4,208 (759) 27.5 M (35,558)
1 Consignments considered for EEEV emergence risk
2 Consignments considered for WEEV emergence risk
3 Consignments considered for VEEV emergence risk
4 Consignments considered for JEV emergence risk
5 Millions
Table 4. Global virus introduction risk, potential infection of local vectors, and fraction attributable to the imported species for
Eastern equine encephalomyelitis virus (EEEV), Western equine encephalomyelitis virus (WEEV), Venezuelan equine
encephalomyelitis virus (VEEV), and Japanese encephalitis virus (JEV), European Union, 2005-2009.
 Species Virus introduction risk and potential infection of local vectors
  EEEV WEEV VEEV JEV
  Intro. a Vectorsb Intro. Vectors Intro. Vectors Intro. Vectors
Global risk  1.00 1.00 0.37 0.02 0.17 0.02 0.02 0.02
Attributable riskc Horses     95% 95%   
 Swine       0% 0%
 Poultry 24% 17% 71% 66%     
 Primates     3% 1%   
 Other birds 6% 5% 26% 26%   100% 100%
 Reptiles 35% 35%       
 Rodents 22% 25%   2% 4%   
 Non-petsd 24% 17% 71% 66% 98% 96% 0% 0%
 Exotic petse 72% 78% 26% 26% 2% 4% 100% 100%
 All 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
a Relative risk of virus introduction (reference: EEEV)
b Potential infection of local vectors (reference: EEEV)
c Risk difference computed with and without the considered species group. As for two distinct species, shipments destination areas may overlap, the column sums (for the
eight species groups or for pets and non-pets) may not be 100%.
d Horse, swine, poultry and primate
e Birds other than poultry, reptiles, rodents
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suitable habitats for this mosquito species (Figure 4). For Ae.
caspius and Ae. dorsalis, favourable areas corresponded to the
major European wetlands. It was also the case for Ae. vexans,
for which part of the valleys of the main rivers (e.g. Rhine,
Danube) were also favourable. For Ae. albopictus, suitable
habitats corresponded to urbanized areas in Italy, the
Netherlands and along the Mediterranean coast. The
differences between the studied arboviruses were more
marked for the potential infection of local vectors than for the
introduction risk: the total value obtained for WEEV, VEEV and
JEV were much lower than that of EEEV (Table 4). Variations
of risk by year were similar to those of the introduction risk
(Figure 2), the VEEV and WEEV curves being closer than for
the introduction risk. For EEEV, approximately 80% of potential
infection of local vectors was attributable to exotic pet imports.
Oppositely, for WEEV and VEEV, the fraction attributable to
non-pet species imports was dominant with 66% and 96% of
total risk, respectively (Table 4). For EEEV, the main area with
a high potential for the infection of local vectors was the north
of Belgium and the south of the Netherlands (Figure 5). The
Figure 2.  Evolution of virus introduction risk and of the potential consequences of virus introductions in the European
Union, 2005-2009.  (a) relative risk of virus introduction (reference: average value for EEEV), (b) potential infection of local vectors
(reference: average value for EEEV), (c) potential occurrence of clinical cases in human (reference: average value for EEE), (d)
potential occurrence of clinical cases in horses (reference: average value for EEE). Thick plain lines: Eastern equine
encephalomyelitis virus, thin plain lines: Western equine encephalomyelitis virus, thick dashed lines: Venezuelan Equine
encephalomyelitis, thin dashed lines: Japanese encephalitis. Y-axes are logarithmic.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0070000.g002
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north of Italy (Po valley, Milan and Venice areas) also
presented a high potential for the infection of local vectors. The
same areas showed high risks for the infection of local vectors
by WEEV, VEEV and JEV. Large cities were often affected,
especially for EEEV and WEEV.
The overall potential for the occurrence of clinical cases in
human and horses was much lower for WEE, VEE and JE than
for EEE. The respective roles of the imported species
appeared contrasted. For EEE, the fraction attributable to
exotic pets was dominant (91% and 81% for the potential
occurrence of clinical cases in human and horses,
respectively). Oppositely, for VEE, the fraction attributable to
non-pet species was dominant (99%). The situation was
intermediate for WEE: the fraction attributable to exotic pet
Figure 3.  Geographic variations of the virus introduction risk in the European Union, 2005-2009.  EEEV: Eastern equine
encephalomyelitis virus, WEEV: Western equine encephalomyelitis virus, VEEV: Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis virus, JEV:
Japanese encephalitis virus. Classes are percentiles of the distribution.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0070000.g003
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species was slightly higher for the risk of potential occurrence
of clinical cases in human (53%), whereas in horses, most of
the risk was attributable to non-pet species (62%) (Table 5).
For human, the potential occurrence of clinical cases remained
approximately constant for EEE, VEE and WEE between 2005
and 2009; the level being always higher for VEE than for WEE.
For JE the indicator value strongly decreased from 2005 to
2006 but increased afterwards, until reaching in 2009 a level
close to that of 2005 (Figure 2). Similar trends were observed
for the potential occurrence of clinical cases in horses, VEE
Figure 4.  Proportion of land surface covered by a suitable habitat for competent vector species in the European
Union.  Culex pipiens: Eastern equine encephalomyelitis virus and Japanese encephalitis virus. Aedes dorsalis, Aedes caspius:
Western equine encephalomyelitis virus. Aedes vexans: Eastern and Western equine encephalomyelitis viruses. Aedes albopictus:
Eastern equine encephalomyelitis virus, Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis virus and Japanese encephalitis virus (only
administrative areas of the EU where it the presence of Ae. albopictus has been reported are considered).
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0070000.g004
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and WEE presenting however similar levels, and JE a stable
level since 2007. High potential areas for the occurrence of
clinical cases in human (Figure 6) coincided with major cities,
the Benelux countries and the north of Italy presenting a higher
risk for each of the four viruses. For the occurrence of clinical
cases in horses (Figure 7), Belgium and the Netherlands were
clearly the highest risk areas, for each of the four viruses.
Discussion
Geographic risk variations showed the existence of hotspots
in the EU for the introduction of EEEV, WEEV, VEEV and JEV
by live animal trade. The existence of such hotspots highlights
the need for an increased awareness and for an adaptation of
surveillance strategies. Parts of Belgium, of the Netherlands
Figure 5.  Geographic variations of the potential infection of local vectors after a virus introduction in the European Union,
2005-2009.  EEEV: Eastern equine encephalomyelitis virus, WEEV: Western equine encephalomyelitis virus, VEEV: Venezuelan
equine encephalomyelitis virus, JEV: Japanese encephalitis virus. Classes are percentiles of the distribution.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0070000.g005
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and of the north of Italy were among the highest risk areas in
the EU27 for each of the four studied viruses. These areas are
densely urbanized, and received many consignments of exotic
pet species. Belgium and the Netherlands are also major
poultry breeding areas that received numerous consignments
of poultry species. Northern Italy was the sole area of the EU
that appeared suitable for each of the five considered vector
species. Belgium and the Netherlands appeared particularly
suitable for Cx. pipiens, and also, at a lesser extent, for the two
considered Aedes species. Finally, these areas are among the
most densely populated of the EU, especially Belgium and the
Netherlands that also have a dense horse population. The
combination of these factors explains the higher introduction
risk as well as the more severe potential consequences of a
virus introduction. It is worth noting that, besides the four
considered viruses, these hotspots are consistent with recent
emergences of arboviruses in the EU: bluetongue serotype 8 in
Belgium and in the Netherlands [40], Schmallenberg virus in
Germany and in the Netherlands [20], Usutu and West-Nile
viruses in northern Italy [17,22,41], where recent laboratory
results also suggest a possible circulation of JEV [42].
Three main drivers may explain the observed geographic
variations of the introduction risk and of the potential
consequences of virus introductions: (i) the import of host
species that may introduce the virus (which determines the
virus introduction risk), (ii) the potential European vector
species and the spatial variations of habitat suitability for these
species (which determines the potential infection of local
vectors), and (iii) the population density of human and equine
(which determines the potential occurrence of clinical cases).
Results show that none of these three drivers was sufficient to
explain, alone, the geographic variations of the risks, which
rather resulted from their combination, with varying results
according to the area in the EU. Of the four studied pathogens,
the highest introduction risk and the most severe potential
consequences were obtained for EEEV. This predominance is
first explained by the host species considered for EEEV
introduction: rodents, birds and reptiles. Most of the EEEV
introduction risk, and most of the potential consequences of
such introductions, was attributed to exotic pet species. In
2005-2009, the most numerous animals imported into the EU
belonged to poultry species, which arrived in the EU in large
size consignments, from a limited number of geographic
origins. Besides, exotic pet species such as rodents, cage birds
or reptiles, that could also support EEEV introduction, were
delivered in EU countries in smaller size consignments, sent
from much more varied origins. Considering that the virus
introduction risk depends not only on the number of imported
animals but also on the diversity of consignments origins,
species imported in numerous small size shipments from many
different origins may induce similar risks as those imported in
large consignments from a limited set of areas. Furthermore,
host species was linked to the destination of consignments.
Poultry consignments were delivered in major European
production areas, which are mainly non-urban, whereas exotic
pets were mainly delivered in large cities, where they are
commercialized. EEEV introduction risk thus applied both in
urban and in non urban areas. The species considered for
potential infection of local vectors also explained the
predominance of EEEV. Among these species, Cx. pipiens had
a very large repartition that could allow local populations to be
infected in most of the places where EEEV could be
introduced, especially in urban areas. The high population
density in such areas finally explains the higher risk for the
occurrence of EEE clinical cases.
Table 5. Global potential occurrence of clinical cases in human and horses, and fraction attributable to the imported species
for Eastern equine encephalomyelitis (EEE), Western equine encephalomyelitis (WEE), Venezuelan equine
encephalomyelitis (VEE), and Japanese encephalitis (JE), European Union, 2005-2009.
 Species Potential occurrence of clinical cases (reference: EEE)
  EEE WEE VEE JE
  Human Horses Human Horses Human Horses Human Horses
Global risk  1.00 1.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03
Attributable riska Horses     99% 98%   
 Swine       0% 0%
 Poultry 4% 15% 43% 62%     
 Primates     <1% <1%   
 Other birds 3% 6% 53% 35%   100% 100%
 Reptiles 36% 39%       
 Rodents 27% 20%   2% 1%   
 Non-petsb 4% 15% 43% 62% 99% 99% 0% 0%
 Exotic petse 91% 81% 53% 35% 2% 1% 100% 100%
 All 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
a Risk difference computed with and without the considered species group. As for two distinct species, shipments destination areas may overlap, the column sums (for the
eight species groups or for pets and non-pets) may not be 100%.
b Horse, swine, poultry and primate
e Birds other than poultry, reptiles, rodents
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For WEEV, VEEV and JEV, the introduction risk and the
potential consequences of virus introductions were lower than
for EEEV. The introduction risk of WEEV by poultry or exotic
bird consignments was widespread, but each of the species
considered for the potential infection of local vectors had a
narrower repartition than Cx. pipiens. This constrained the
potential infection of vectors by WEEV. For VEEV, the
introduction risk was almost exclusively attributed to horses,
and was also widely spread. However, none of the imported
horses originated from a country that had reported clinical
cases between 2005 and 2009: VEEV introduction risk was
thus probably overestimated. Furthermore, Ae. albopictus,
considered for the potential infection of local vectors, was
limited to Italy and to the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, Ae.
Figure 6.  Geographic variations of the potential occurrence of clinical cases in human after a virus introduction in the
European Union, 2005-2009.  EEE: Eastern equine encephalomyelitis, WEE: Western equine encephalomyelitis, VEE: Venezuelan
equine encephalomyelitis, JE: Japanese encephalitis. Classes are percentiles of the distribution.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0070000.g006
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albopictus has been regularly observed in glasshouses,
although surveillance data suggest that the species has not
established itself in the surrounding areas [43]. Thus, the
potential infection of local vectors by VEEV was probably
overestimated in this area. Conversely, for JEV, the limiting
factor was not the vector species (Culex pipiens), but rather the
volume of imports of birds from Southeast Asia (no swine was
imported from this area), that strongly decreased after 2005
because of influenza bans.
Our results are coherent with a recent qualitative analysis of
the emergence risk of zoonotic arboviruses by trade and
migration [44] according to which the chances for establishing
new endemic foci were moderate for VEEV and for JEV, and
moderate to high for WEEV and EEEV. To our knowledge, no
Figure 7.  Geographic variations of the potential occurrence of clinical cases in horses after a virus introduction in the
European Union, 2005-2009.  EEE: Eastern equine encephalomyelitis, WEE: Western equine encephalomyelitis, VEE: Venezuelan
equine encephalomyelitis, JE: Japanese encephalitis. Classes are percentiles of the distribution.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0070000.g007
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quantitative analysis has been conducted on the introduction
risk in the EU for EEEV, WEEV, VEEV or of JEV. This can be
explained by the lack of quantitative data about the prevalence
of these viruses in their maintenance hosts in their natural
repartition areas that makes the parameterization of
quantitative risk assessment models difficult. The approach
proposed here does not aim at estimating introduction
probabilities, but risk indicators that vary in the same way as
the actual risk and may be used to compare the risk levels for
different pathogens or for different geographic areas. The
whole methodology is generic and could be easily applied to
other arboviruses. The proposed indicator for risk introduction
combines the number of imported animals and the diversity of
their geographic origins. Assuming that each origin has a low
probability of harbouring an enzootic virus circulation, the
introduction risk is increased by the diversity of origins. This
diversity was quantified using Simpson’s index, which is widely
used in biodiversity studies. In our case, this index takes into
account not only the diversity of consignments origins, but also
the repartition of the imported animals in these consignments.
For a given number of origins and of imported animals,
Simpson’s index value will be the greatest if each origin
provided the same number of animals. Indeed, this
corresponds to the worst case situation, in terms of virus
introduction risk. The potential infection of local vectors by the
introduced animals was quantified using an original model of
habitat suitability for potential European vector species that
combines land cover data available all over the EU (Corin Land
Cover) with entomologists’ knowledge about the suitability of
land cover themes for each of the considered vector species. A
similar work has been recently performed to identify European
suitable areas of Rift valley fever circulation given a viral
introduction [45]. Four of the five mosquito species considered
here were studied, namely Cx. pipiens, Ae. vexans, Ae.
albopictus and Ae. caspius. The species distributions,
determined according to entomologists’ knowledge, were
validated using trapping data from Italy. A good consistency
was observed between the expected distribution and field data.
We may thus assume that our maps of expected presence of
vectors are relatively accurate and close to field reality. In the
future, besides land cover, the proposed distribution maps
could be improved by integrating other environmental factors
such as latitude, elevation or climatic variables such as
temperature or rainfalls. Seasonal variations of vector
abundance in the EU may influence the potential infection of
local vectors by introduced animals, according to the calendar
date at which they are imported. It is also the case for the
seasonal variations of vector abundance in the country of origin
that may influence the risk of infection of imported animals, and
thus the introduction risk. Moreover, the local availability of
competent hosts (birds and rodents) and host-feeding patterns
of mosquito have to be considered. For example, Cx. Pipiens is
known to be mainly a bird-feeder, Ae. caspius and Ae. dorsalis
are rather mammal-feeders and Ae. albopictus is rather
opportunistic. Thus, the potential infection of local vectors may
be changed depending on the interaction between imported
host species and vector species. For simplicity reasons, host-
feeding patterns were not considered here, and this could have
induced an overestimation of the potential infection of local
vectors.
Only the risk of virus introduction by legal live animal trade
was considered in the present study. Risk mitigation measures
were not taken into account and the calculated risk indices thus
correspond to a residual risk, once the mitigation procedures
have been performed. However, at least in principle, these
procedures are equally applied all over the EU, and thus do not
bias the geographic variations of risk. Illegal trade is, by
definition, difficult to quantify [46]. However, even if the
individual market value of the illegally imported animals may be
very high, the total number of imported animals is probably
much lower than the total number of legally imported animals.
Besides the legal or illegal trade of live animals, other
introduction pathways are possible for the studied pathogens:
the movements of persons and of cargo. International
transportation authorities estimated that 831 million passengers
flew internationally in 2007, and the world tourism organization
estimated 924 million tourists’ arrivals in 2008. The European
Union (EU) was the first destination of these tourists: among
the 10 most visited countries in 2006, 6 belonged to the EU,
which represented 30% of the total number of tourists’ arrivals
[47]. Human is considered a dead-end host for EEEV, WEEV
and JEV. However, viraemic persons could represent an
introduction path for VEEV. The movement of approximately
90% of non-bulk cargo worldwide is carried out by containers
on specific transport ships. The movements of goods, with the
generalization of this containerization, have been responsible
for the transcontinental movements of vector species, such as
Ae. albopictus, from south-eastern Asia to northern America,
southern America and Europe [30]. Introduction of infected
vectors in cargo containers is thus also possible. However, the
respective importance of live animal trade and of persons and
cargo movements for the introduction of EEEV, WEEV, VEEV
and JEV still needs to be determined.
Data about the international trade of exotic pets are scarce,
and this work is the first quantitative description of exotic pet
imports in the EU. An unexpected large number of exotic pets
imports was observed: reptiles and rodents as well as, at a
lesser extent, cage birds. Rodents were the second most
imported species group in terms of number of consignments
(after horses), while reptiles were the second most imported
species group in terms of number of animals (after poultry).
The major difference between exotic pet trade and farm animal
trade is of course the diversity of species. Four species
dominate farm animals trade (cattle, pig, poultry and horses),
whereas the trade of live wild animals (sold as exotic pets)
involves hundreds of species (ornemental fishes, reptiles, cage
birds and birds of prey, mammals), a diversity that is favoured
by the use of internet by buyers. This species diversity is
unfortunately poorly documented as the identity of the imported
species is not (or rarely) indicated in the TRACES database.
Officials that control the consignments at the border inspection
posts should be better trained for reptile and cage bird species
identification [46]. Moreover, if regulations of international farm
animal trade have been designed to protect the disease-free
status of importing countries, it is not the case for the
regulations of the international trade of wild animals, which
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have rather been designed to protect endangered species [48].
At their arrival in the EU, housing conditions and health status
of such imported animals shoud thus be more systematically
controlled. Finally, arboviruses are known to often have a
broad host range, a characteristic which may be explained by a
positive selective pressure [7] especially in a context of global
biodiversity loss. This diversity is not fully documented for
existing arboviruses and field studies regularly allow identifying
new host species in natural foci (e.g., for EEEV [49–51]). In the
future, the increasing species diversity of imported animals
may thus have an important impact on the introduction of
arboviruses.
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